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Abstract
Public organizations operate as open systems in settings that can be a source 
of difficulties for managers and for program performance. The unexpected 
arrival of two major hurricanes in 2005 caused widespread havoc, and some of 
the consequences constituted major shocks to public agencies—in particular, 
to public educational systems. This article assesses whether such shocks 
caused drops in performance, and whether organization and management 
contributed to a mitigation of these deleterious effects. Evidence indicates 
that shocks do disrupt performance but also that staff capacity and stability 
in street-level personnel of the organizations can reduce or eliminate these 
negative consequences.
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Public organizations operate as open systems in contexts that can provide 
both opportunities and constraints for those who care about and benefit from 
program performance as well as for those who manage the organizations 
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(Lynn, 1987). A portion of the benefits and difficulties that stem from a pub-
lic organization’s environment can be anticipated or at least planned for in 
some loose sense. Public organizations, in practice, often develop specialized 
subunits to help procure benefits from the setting (e.g., budget development), 
stimulate more diffuse support from the environment (public information 
offices), or protect against unwanted perturbations (information technology 
security bureaus).
One set of functions that public management can perform is to devote 
attention and resources to both exploiting and buffering from these and other 
external exigencies: in other words, managing outward (Moore, 1995; 
O’Toole, Meier, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2005). Sometimes, however, such 
externally directed managerial efforts are insufficient. When negative envi-
ronmental fluctuations are not screened from the organization and its pro-
grams but instead penetrate into organizational operations, additional 
functions of management come to the fore. Internal management becomes 
essential in dampening the untoward impacts or mitigating the ramifications 
that might otherwise reverberate through the systems (Rainey, 2003).
One especially challenging variety of such disruptive influences originat-
ing in the environment of public organizations is the subset of disturbances 
comprising negative organizational shocks: unanticipated problems that arise 
without warning, spread quickly, carry manifold implications for the opera-
tions of programs, and penetrate deep inside public organizations and their 
production processes. Such “nightmare scenarios” haunt the dreams of many 
public managers—for instance, those organizing for the possibilities of 
deadly pandemics, mass terror, earthquake disasters, or overwhelming num-
bers of refugees from warfare or famine.
Even in more mundane but no less important fields of policy, managers and 
organizations must sometimes cope with sizable negative shocks that land 
without notice inside the organizational system and simply must be handled. A 
classic case of just such an eventuality occurred on the Gulf Coast of the United 
States during 2005, when two major hurricanes descended on the same region 
within weeks of each other and caused massive destruction and considerable 
loss of life. Aside from those who were required to deal swiftly with the emer-
gency needs of the moment—police, fire and rescue, disaster relief, public 
health, and other such programs and agencies—many additional organizations 
and their managers found themselves having to manage major shocks stem-
ming from the hurricanes and their aftermath, perturbations that had penetrated 
their organizations as well and posed substantial managerial challenges.
Public organizations and public managers, in short, sometimes face the 
“fire and rain” (to borrow singer-songwriter James Taylor’s imagery) from a 
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major unanticipated disruption and must seek to mitigate its negative impacts. 
In this article, we examine via a natural experiment design how the perfor-
mance of a large set of public organizations—public school districts—in the 
Gulf Coast region was affected by the hurricanes of 2005. We also explore 
the key question of whether and how aspects of management were able to 
reduce or eliminate measurable disruptive impacts.
We begin by sketching a perspective on how public organizations might 
deal with shocks from their environments. We connect this theoretical dis-
cussion to a formal model of management and performance that offers a pre-
cise way to think about the question. We then summarize the hurricane-related 
events and their consequences for public school districts in the state of Texas. 
The core of the analysis then focuses on performance impacts of the unantici-
pated shocks, as well as whether and how aspects of the organizations and 
their management were able to mitigate the consequences of the fire and rain. 
We conclude by sketching implications.
Environmental Shocks, Public Organizations, and 
Public Management: A Perspective and a Model
Organizations can deal with environmental shocks in two ways. First, they can 
buffer the shocks and prevent them from interfering with the technical core of 
the organization (Lynn, 2005; Thompson, 1967). Second, organizations can 
cope with the shocks that penetrate the boundaries of the organization.
A basic fact of organizations is that not all shocks can be buffered to avoid 
affecting the organization. In fact, a rational organization would not seek a 
process of total buffering because that would create an internally closed sys-
tem that would limit organizational learning and change (Lynn, 2005; Soren-
son, 2003). Some turbulence can be anticipated and is likely to occur with 
sufficient frequency and generate only mild to moderate negative impacts on 
organizational routines and production; these are the situations in which buff-
ering efforts can be effective. But not all negative shocks can be anticipated, 
at least in sufficient detail to protect organizational processes. Some such 
shocks are low-probability events, and it could be counterproductive to 
design buffering units or processes to guard against many such different vari-
eties of rare events. An important concern therefore is how to deal with the 
environmental turbulence that penetrates the organizational buffers and 
affects the production elements of the organization. Two possibilities are 
sketched in the literature. First, the organization can establish internal struc-
tures that permit the organization to adjust to these shocks. An organization 
might decentralize its processes (say, geographically) and permit these 
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independent units to assess and deal with the change. Resulting successes can 
then be communicated to the rest of the organization. Alternatively, the orga-
nization might build slack into parts of the organization most likely to come 
into contact with environmental changes and ask those parts to devise solu-
tions for the organization (see Sorenson, 2003). Second, the organization 
might seek to manage the shock and its organizational consequences. An 
untimely budget cut, for example, can be dealt with by reducing noncritical 
expenditures, procuring cheaper inputs, or focusing only on key clientele 
(see Meier & O’Toole, 2009).
How might these two general strategies for addressing organizational 
shocks be fit into current management theory? In 1999 O’Toole and Meier 
provided a parsimonious model of public management that incorporated 
these environmental functions of public management, (including a specifica-
tion of the buffering function). Specifically, after reviewing the extensive 
case study and qualitative literature on public management, they posited the 
following model:
 Ot = β1(S + M1)Ot – 1 + β2(Xt /S)(M3/M4) + εt  (1)
where
O is some measure of outcome,
S is a measure of stability, denoting structural, procedural, and other 
elements that support unperturbed production,
M denotes management, which can be divided into three parts:
M1 management’s contribution to organizational stability through 
additions to hierarchy or structure as well as regular operations,
M3 management’s efforts to exploit the environment,
M4 management’s effort to buffer environmental shocks,
X is a vector of environmental forces,
ε is an error term,
the other subscripts denote time periods, and
β1 and β2 are estimable parameters.
Where does buffering, as we have defined it, appear in the model? It is 
present as the denominator of the second, or environmental, term:
 β2(Xt/S)(M3/M4) (2)
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or, after rearranging,
 β2(XtM3)/(SM4) (3)
This term models the impact of the set of environmental forces Xt on out-
come Ot. The impact can be leveraged by managerial effort (M3) or buffered 
by the combined impacts of stabilizing forces (S) like structure as well as 
managerial influences aimed at protecting the production system (M4). Note 
that this model simplifies by treating the buffering function in mathematical 
terms solely as a dampener. This reciprocal function (1/SM4) essentially 
reduces the size of impact that an X or environmental variable can have 
(hence the division into X), by dampening the impact over time. It is the SM4 
denominator as a whole, then, that serves as the model’s term for buffering 
(Meier & O’Toole, 2008).
If the environmental shock penetrates the organization (or if X′—i.e., 
some portion of the shock X—does) then the public management model 
reduces to the following:
 Ot = β1(S + M1)Ot – 1 + β2(Xt′) + εt  (4)
This formula suggests that coping with an environmental shock that has pen-
etrated the organization will be addressed either by the internal structure of 
the organization (S) or by management (M1). Although there are only a mod-
est number of studies of organizational buffering (Lynn’s 2005 review essay 
cites only five) and only one study that focuses on the role of buffering to 
improve performance (Meier & O’Toole, 2008), quantitative studies of orga-
nizations that deal with shocks penetrating the organization are even rarer. 
Conducting such an analysis is our focus here.
The Environmental Shocks
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast of the 
United States near the Louisiana–Mississippi state line. Although it had 
achieved Category 5 status (the highest rating for a hurricane), its impact had 
diminished to Category 3 at landfall. An estimated 1,900 deaths were attrib-
uted to Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding; property damage was 
estimated at $81.2 billion. The flooding of New Orleans and subsequent 
problems resulted in a mass evacuation of Louisiana residents. Included 
among these evacuees were 46,503 students (plus their families) who were 
relocated to Texas and enrolled in Texas public schools. Of these students, a 
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total of 35,091 remained in Texas schools until the end of the 2005-2006 
school year.1
While coping with widespread devastation from Hurricane Katrina, and 
also the relocation of thousands of students and their families, the people of 
the Gulf Coast region took a second blow—this one from Hurricane Rita, the 
most intense tropical cyclone ever observed in the Gulf of Mexico. The storm 
made landfall near the Texas–Louisiana border on September 24, 2005. 
Although only seven fatalities were attributed directly to the hurricane, it did 
cause $10 billion in property damage.2 Many damaged facilities were schools 
in east Texas. The evacuation itself shut down most schools in the Gulf Coast 
region, and because schools further inland served as evacuee centers, these 
schools were also closed for a period of time. A total of 243 Texas school 
districts were closed an average of 6 days, with some districts closed for 5 or 
more weeks.
The two hurricanes created two distinct natural experiments in terms of 
how public organizations respond to environmental shocks. First, many dis-
tricts received an influx of students from Louisiana. Given that the Louisiana 
public schools are generally perceived to be inferior to the Texas schools and 
given the poor urban areas that sent evacuees to Texas, the general perception 
was that Texas schools received an unexpected flood of students who were 
not likely to perform well in class and were also living with multiple chal-
lenges resulting from their evacuee status. Many struggled with health, hous-
ing, and other difficulties. Second, many districts were then closed for a week 
or more, thus creating the need to adjust curricula and lesson plans to the 
shortened time period.
The important theoretical aspect of these two environmental shocks is 
that they both penetrated to the technical core of the organization (i.e., the 
teaching of students). Many environmental shocks can be screened out (as 
indicated in the second term of the model) as management seeks to buffer 
or as stabilizing forces dampen the environmental shocks. For example, a 
law such as No Child Left Behind with its massive reporting requirements 
might be handled by special reporting units rather than the schools them-
selves. In the present case, there was no way to avoid the arrival of new 
students or the closing of schools. The addition of new students or the can-
celling of class days directly affected the production processes (i.e., the 
schools and classrooms) of the school district. This logic suggests that we 
then seek information on how school districts mitigated the impact of the 
two hurricanes and that we do so by focusing on the first term of the model, 
the internal management and structural elements represented in the model’s 
first term.
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Data and Measurement
The units of analysis are all Texas school districts with 500 or more students.3 
The smaller districts are excluded from study here because these units often 
have highly fluctuating test data (our dependent variable measuring perfor-
mance) that are overly sensitive to the handful of students who are examined. 
In such cases, the ability to control for past performance is limited, and thus 
the estimation of how much an intervention event affected performance may 
be biased or inefficient. One advantage of using the Texas schools data set is 
that it has been used by a number of public management scholars (Fernández, 
2005; Goerdel, 2006; Gonzalez Juenke, 2005; Hicklin, 2004; Hill, 2005; 
Pitts, 2005) and therefore offers several validated measures of management, 
structure, and performance. The 703 school districts included in the study 
range widely on a variety of dimensions, including student composition 
(race, ethnicity, etc.), resources, setting (urban, rural, suburban), and perfor-
mance. All data used in the analysis, including hurricane-related data, were 
obtained from the Texas Education Agency.
X: Measuring the Environmental Shock
Unexpected influxes of students who are hurricane evacuees constitute 
shocks or perturbations to school districts and their educational mission. Two 
measures of environmental shock are used in this analysis. First, the Katrina-
student-influx shock is tapped by using the percentage of the student body in 
a school district that was composed of Katrina evacuees at the end of the 
2005-2006 school year (thus, measured in late spring 2006). The year-end 
count is used rather than the initial count because students often moved from 
temporary districts to “permanent” districts in Texas as parents became 
employed. A total of 424 of the 703 districts in the study enrolled at least 
some Katrina evacuees as students, with a range from 0% to 5.42% of the 
district’s total enrollment; these districts enrolled 99.8% of all Katrina evacu-
ees enrolled in Texas public schools (see Table 1). Of those districts receiving 
students, the average evacuee enrollment was 0.47% of the overall total; but 
as the standard deviation shows, the distribution is positively skewed.
Second, the shock due to Rita is measured by the total number of days the 
school district was closed because of the impact of the storm. (Rita caused a 
number of Texas system closures, but Katrina, for which the brunt of the 
impact occurred considerably further to the east, caused few Texas district 
closures.) Table 1 shows that 243 districts were closed approximately 1 week 
(5.14 days) but that the standard deviation indicates a positively skewed 
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distribution. Twenty-eight districts were closed more than 2 weeks. Logic 
suggests that the relationship between days missed and student performance 
is likely to be subject to a threshold effect. Missing a single day of class is 
unlikely to cause major problems for teachers or students. To account for 
such a threshold, we recalculated this variable to include days missed only if 
the period of closing constituted more than 1 week of school (i.e., 6 or more 
days); 60 districts met this criterion.4
The two environmental shocks affected some of the same districts. Of 
those districts in the study, 20% were hit by both shocks whereas 67.1% were 
hit by at least one of the shocks.5 Because these measures of the extent of 
shocks sustained are somewhat collinear and because we shall try to explain 
the response to the shocks via interactive effects, we estimate the impact of 
these shocks both separately and also together in the same equation. The 
results are highly similar, although the impact of Katrina students is lessened 
by its collinearity with the Rita or days measure.6
O: Outcome Measures
Although school systems, like almost all public organizations and public pro-
grams, have multiple goals and thus are subject to multiple performance indi-
cators, certain objectives are defined by the political environment as more 
important than others (O’Toole & Meier, 2004). By one lower standard, the 
schools were a clear success; 46,000 students were absorbed and damaged 
schools reopened. But Texas schools also operate under an elaborate account-
ability system using a standardized test called the Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). The TAKS is a criterion-based standardized 
test given in Grades 3 through 8 and also used as an exit exam. This latter 
instrument is a high-stakes test, and students must pass it to graduate from a 
Texas high school. Aggregate pass rates on the TAKS are the centerpiece of 
the accountability system, and the examination results are without question 
the most visible indicator of performance used to assess the quality of 
Table 1. Organizational Shocks: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
M SD Low High
Mean of Affected 
Districts
Relocated students as percentage 
of enrollment
0.28 0.52 0.00 5.42 0.47
Days of school missed due to 
district closure
1.36 3.34 0.00 29 5.14
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schools. The release of annual TAKS scores is front-page news throughout 
the state, and poor aggregate performance on the TAKS can result in penal-
ties, including state takeover of the district.
Because the “official” TAKS pass rate, known as the accountability subset, 
permits students to be excluded from the test if the student is enrolled in spe-
cial education, has limited English skills, or has not resided in the district for 
a sufficient time period, we do not use the official rate in our analysis. Rather, 
we use the pass rate for all students in the district. This is especially important 
in picking up the impact of the Katrina students, because many of them might 
have changed districts after the late October deadline and thus might be 
excluded from the accountability subset. Because the overall pass rate we use 
includes all students, the pass rates are lower than those officially used to rate 
and evaluate districts. For the 2005-2006 school year, the average TAKS pass 
rate when all students are included was 66.4% with a standard deviation of 
10.9%; the all-pass rates are normally distributed and range from 31% to 96%.
Many of the other performance indicators used to assess schools are not 
particularly valuable in the present study because the measures are not likely 
to be sensitive to environmental shocks or were not collected in time. College 
preparation indicators such as SAT or ACT scores, for example, are not avail-
able for approximately 1 year after TAKS test results are released; in addi-
tion, performance on such indicators reflects only the age cohort that is taking 
the test in any given year. Two other possible performance indicators are 
available: the “commended” pass rate and school attendance. The com-
mended pass rate is based on a much higher test score; to illustrate, in the 
average district only 9.9% of students passed all tests at the commended level 
of performance. Because this measure is affected by a much smaller number 
of students and the overwhelming majority of students do not meet this stan-
dard, the influx of students and the missed days is unlikely to have much 
impact. Attendance results are tightly clustered with a mean of 95.9% and a 
standard deviation of 0.7%. This lack of variation means finding impacts for 
any variables, including the hurricanes, will be difficult. Although the analy-
sis in this article will therefore focus primarily on the TAKS results, we shall 
also note in passing any impacts on these two other measures.
Control Variables
Our theory specifies an autoregressive model, and that fits well the logic 
undergirding the notion of environmental shocks. Our analysis therefore 
includes the 2005 TAKS pass rate in all models that estimate 2006 perfor-
mance impacts.7 The posthurricane TAKS results are thus assessed relative to 
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the prehurricane TAKS results (a before–after research design). Although 
such an estimation controls for the history of the school district by incorpo-
rating it in this lagged dependent variable, other changes in school district 
resources or constraints could also affect performance for 2006. To control 
for these factors, we include five measures of resources and three measures 
of constraints. These variables are taken from the extremely well developed 
education production function literature and have demonstrated validity in 
scores of studies (Hanushek, 1996; Hedges & Greenwald, 1996).
Schools and school districts clearly vary in how difficult it is to educate 
their students. Some districts have homogeneous student populations from 
upper-middle-class backgrounds. Students such as these are quite likely to do 
well in school regardless of what the school does (see Burtless, 1996). Other 
districts with a large number of poor students, and a highly diverse student 
body will find it more difficult to attain high levels of performance because 
the schools will have to make up for a less supportive home environment and 
deal with more complex and more varied learning problems (Jencks & Phil-
lips, 1998). Our three measures of task difficulty are the percentages of stu-
dents who are Black, Latino, and poor. The last-mentioned variable is 
measured by the percentage that is eligible for free or reduced-price school 
lunch. All three measures should be negatively related to performance.
Although the linkage between resources and performance in schools has 
been controversial (see Hanushek, 1996; Hedges & Greenwald, 1996), a grow-
ing literature of well-designed longitudinal studies confirms that like other orga-
nizations, schools with more resources generally fare better (Finn & Achilles, 
1999; Nye, Hedges, & Konstantopoulos, 1999; Wenglinsky, 1997). Five mea-
sures of resources are included. The average teacher salary, per student instruc-
tional spending, and class size are directly tied to monetary resources. The 
average years of teaching experience and the percentage of teachers who are not 
certified are related to the human resources of the school district. Class size and 
noncertified teachers should be negatively related to student performance; 
teacher experience, instructional funding, and teacher salaries should be posi-
tively related to performance. All eight of these measures are change, or differ-
enced, measures—that is, they measure the change in the variable from 2005 to 
2006. All impact of the variables’ levels (thus if resources act as a stock of capi-
tal rather than a flow) should be reflected in the lagged dependent variable.8
Findings
Do unanticipated negative shocks result in performance drops? Table 2 presents 
our findings, developed via OLS multiple regression, for the impact of the two 
environmental shocks on the Texas school districts. These shocks are estimated 
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separately (columns 1 and 2) as well as simultaneously in the same equation 
(column 3). By counting only those districts that missed more than 1 week of 
school, the collinearity between the two shock variables is reduced and the two 
different single-shock estimations are relatively similar. The third column with 
both shock measures included in the model shows that a 1 percentage point 
increase in Katrina students (as a percentage of the student body) is associated 
with a drop in the TAKS all-pass rate scores of 0.437% (p < .05, one-tailed test). 
Although some of this drop might have been the result of the originally enrolled 
students not doing well as the result of more crowded classes and other factors, 
this effect size is the equivalent of 43.7% of Katrina evacuees failing the TAKS 
(in contrast to the statewide average of 33.6%). The maximum total impact of 
Katrina students on district performance, based on the maximum of 5.42% 
evacuee students, is approximately 2.4 points on the TAKS pass rate.9
The missed-class-days variable has a similar negative and statistically sig-
nificant impact on TAKS scores. Each additional day (above 5 total days) 
that schools were closed is associated with a decline in TAKS scores of 0.131 
percentage points on the pass rate. Based on the largest value of days closed 
(29), the maximum impact on performance in districts suffering from closed 
schools is estimated to be approximately 3.1 points.10 The remaining factors 
Table 2. Environmental Shocks and Student Performance: The Impact of 
Students and Missed Class Days
Independent Variable Slope Slope Slope
Students −0.479* (1.84) – −0.437* (1.68)
Days missed – −0.138* (2.36) −0.131* (2.23)
Lagged pass rate 0.928* (80.47) 0.928* (80.58) 0.928* (80.70)
Change in teacher salary 0.000 (0.98) 0.000 (0.85) 0.000 (0.91)
Instruction funds 0.136* (1.65) 0.137* (1.67) 0.134 (1.64)
Black students 0.139 (0.84) 0.020 (0.13) 0.129 (0.79)
Latino students −0.149 (1.32) −0.179 (1.59) −0.163 (1.45)
Poor students −0.005 (0.13) −0.008 (0.22) −0.006 (0.17)
Class size −0.654* (2.98) −0.758* (3.42) −0.732* (3.31)
Teacher experience 0.069 (0.40) 0.089 (0.52) 0.064 (0.37)
Noncertified −0.034 (1.09) −0.035 (1.14) −0.032 (1.02)
n 703 703 703
R2 .91 .91 .91
F 735.05 737.55 672.53
SE 3.21 3.21 3.21
Note: Dependent variable = All-students TAKS pass rate. Values within parentheses are t 
scores. TAKS = Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills.
*p < .05 (one-tailed test).
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in the equation are generally consistent with past research. Clearly the autore-
gressive term dominates the equation; it especially does so given the limita-
tion to districts with 500+ students. This point is reflected in the extremely 
high coefficient of determination accounting for 91% of the variance in 2006 
TAKS scores. Of the differenced measures, only class size reaches the .05 
level of statistical significance; an increase in class size from 2005 to 2006 
was associated with a predictable drop in TAKS scores.
Estimating the performance results of the hurricane shocks raises the 
important theoretical question of how the districts responded to the shocks 
and whether there were factors operating that could have (or in some districts 
did) mitigate(d) these negative results. An analysis of the residuals from the 
equations in Table 2 confirms that the hurricane-affected districts include 
both positive and negative residuals; some districts were able to take one or 
both shocks and still outperform expectations. East Chambers Independent 
School District, for example, was closed for 12 days and had slightly more 
than 1% of its study body as Katrina students, yet the district scored 6.9 per-
centage points above the regression line.
The parsimonious theory of public management that we use (see equation 
(4) above) implies that districts might mitigate shocks in one or more of three 
fashions—through the stabilizing effects of structural (and other) elements, 
the operations of management in supporting and reinforcing performance-
related operations, and/or the inertia that carries established practices for-
ward into the future (past performance). The easiest explanation to consider 
is that for past performance. Prior performance is already in the model as part 
of the autoregressive estimation; for past performance to matter more than it 
does in Table 2, it would have to interact with either or both of the shock 
variables in such a manner that high-performing districts would be less 
affected by the shock than low-performing districts. We tested this idea (anal-
ysis not shown), but the impact of past performance as interacted with the 
two shocks was not sufficient to overcome the negative impacts.
If high levels of prior performance do not mitigate the negative impact of 
environmental shocks, then structure and management are the two logical 
possibilities. With regard to structure, Sorenson’s (2003) assessment of the 
computer workstation industry suggests that vertical integration can be a key 
to dealing with a turbulent environment. Vertical integration is enhanced by 
a strong central management team that can take the results from various sub-
units and determine what lessons the organization might learn. In the present 
case, greater central management capacity permits a set of decisions to be 
made concerning how to evaluate the incoming students,11 which schools can 
be assigned the evacuee students, what resources have to be shifted to the 
needed schools, how one can restructure curricula to make up for missed 
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days, and what resources need to be procured from outside the district. By 
using central management to make these decisions and perform these tasks, 
the district does not pull school-level personnel away from the day-to-day 
operations of the district.
To measure central management capacity, which represents a structural 
resource that might mitigate the performance impacts of negative shocks, we 
use the percentage of total staff that are assigned to central office administra-
tion. Texas school districts are relatively lean in terms of central office 
administration; the mean for all districts in the study is 1.34%, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.63%. Because this is a measure of personnel assignment 
and organizational design rather than a measure of management activity per 
se, this measure is best interpreted as a stabilizing or structural variable (S).12
Why is the percentage of central office administration a good measure of 
managerial capacity? First, this is a relatively common measure that has been 
used with some merit in a variety of empirical studies of organizations (Dal-
ton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding, & Porter, 1980). Second, in our discussions 
with school district officials, they consistently stress that they need central 
office capacity to deal with the tough problems of truancy, dropouts, and pro-
grams for at-risk students. Our own analysis shows that even with extensive 
controls, the size of the central office bureaucracy is positively associated 
with attendance and African American student performance and negatively 
related to dropouts. Third, a study of responses to major budget cuts (Meier & 
O’Toole, 2009) shows that having central office capacity is positively associ-
ated with a series of decisions that minimize the impact of these cuts.
To determine if management capacity afforded by central structure can 
mitigate the negative impact of either or both of the unexpected arrival of 
students or the missed school days, we interacted this variable with each of 
the hurricane shocks. These results are presented in Table 3. Such interactive 
models induce a fair amount of collinearity and fundamentally change the 
interpretation of coefficients. The standard errors normally used to determine 
statistical significance need to be recalculated as one determines the marginal 
impact of the shocks given the level of managerial capacity. To illustrate, the 
slope for days of school closed now depends on the value of managerial 
capacity, and this can be determined by taking both the slope for the days of 
school and the interaction term (from column 3):
–0.222 × Days + 0.095 × (Days × Administration)
grouping the terms, gives us
[–0.222 + (0.095 × Administration)] × Days
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We can then use this equation to draw a line that will show the impact of 
a day of school lost at various levels of administrative capacity (see Figure 
1). This figure, which also displays the 95% confidence limits, indicates that 
at low levels of administrative capacity, the impact of missing a day of class 
is negative and statistically significant. As the level of central administration 
increases, however, this negative impact becomes less and essentially 
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero at approximately 1.0% of 
central administrators. One can set the slope equation equal to zero and get a 
point estimate of when the negative impact ceases (i.e., has a slope of zero); 
this occurs when central office administrative is equal to 2.33% of total 
employment. The equation actually shows a positive slope at very high levels 
of central administration, but this can be ignored for two reasons: those val-
ues are not statistically different from zero, and only a small percentage of 
districts have central administration percentages that high (48 of the 703). 
The logical conclusion is that as central administrative capacity grows, it 
gradually eliminates the negative impact of the environmental shock on 
performance.13
Table 3 also shows that central management capacity has a similar impact 
on the shock of Katrina evacuee students (see also Figure 2). The impact of 
evacuee students is strongly negative and statistically significant at low lev-
els of managerial capacity but declines in impact as central administration 
Table 3. Administrative Capacity Can Overcome the Impact of Environmental 
Shocks
Independent Variable Slope Slope Slope
Students −0.901 (1.60) – −0.864 (1.53)
Days missed – −0.233 (1.54) −0.222 (1.47)
Central administration 0.381* (1.71) 0.454* (2.30) 0.328 (1.46)
Students × Administration 0.442 (0.96) – 0.434 (0.94)
Days × Administration – 0.101 (0.78) 0.095 (0.73)
Lagged pass rate 0.929* (80.80) 0.928* (80.73) 0.928* (80.81)
n 703 703 703
R2 .91 .92 .92
F 617.58 619.18 531.84
SE 3.21 3.20 3.20
Note: Dependent variable = All-students TAKS pass rate. Values within parentheses are t 
scores. Equations also control for change in teachers salaries, per student instructional funds, 
class size, teachers’ experience, noncertified teachers, Black students, Latino students, and 
poor students. TAKS = Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills.
*p < .05 (one-tailed test).
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increases. The point prediction of zero impact is estimated to be approxi-
mately 1.99% central office staff (relatively similar to the Days impact). 
Again the positive slope predictions are never statistically different from zero 
and cover only 93 of the 703 total districts. In short, central management 
capacity appears to mitigate the negative impacts of the hurricanes.
If structure can mitigate the impact of environmental shocks, is it possible 
that management can do so as well? Although several measures of manage-
ment have been developed by others using the Texas data sets, most of these 
measures are either for external relations (i.e., they apply to the environmen-
tal portion of the model) or are ambiguous as to whether they refer to internal 
or external management (e.g., the Meier & O’Toole, 2002, salary residual 
measure of management quality). The one internal management measure is 
an indirect one: O’Toole and Meier (2003) contend that employee stability 
reflects, among other things, the ability of and effort by managers to manage 
human resources and thus retain employees. They then show that employee 
stability is positively related to organizational performance for a variety of 
performance indicators. They contend that their measure of employee stabil-
ity, the percentage of teachers who remain in the organization from one year 
to the next, reflects the preservation and enhancement of human capital in the 
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organization. The teacher stability measure has a mean of 84.4% and a stan-
dard deviation of 4.8%; it ranges from 63.6% to 97.4%.
We use this measure to tap an aspect of human resources management in 
the districts. Greater teacher stability and the expertise and experience it 
brings means that the teaching function can operate with little supervision in 
times of crisis. It likely also means a better ability to handle new problems 
such as poorly prepared displaced students or a change in curricula. Table 4 
shows regression results with the interactions between teacher stability and 
the hurricane shocks. Figures 3 and 4 show the marginal effects of the shocks 
contingent on various levels of teacher stability. Although the contingent 
relationships for turnover are not as strong as those for management capacity, 
they show a reduction in the negative impacts of crises. To illustrate, let us 
assume a high-turnover district with a stability measure of 75%. Figure 3 
(and the resulting calculations) shows that the predicted impact of a 1 per-
centage point increase in Katrina students for this district is a drop of 0.86 
percentage points on the TAKS, a statistically significant impact (a more pre-
cise graph would show the significance level touching the zero point at 
approximately this level). This impact decreases to zero as the stability of the 
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teacher force increases (the point estimate for zero is 92.67). Using the same 
75% figure for days of school missed, we can predict that each additional day 
of closed schools (above 5) results in a drop of 0.25 percentage points in 
TAKS scores, again a statistically significant impact (Figure 4). Similar to 
the Katrina impact, this negative impact gradually drops to be indistinguish-
able from zero. In this case the point estimate for zero is 98.1, which is 
beyond the range of the variable (the maximum is 97.4), but the important 
point is not that the predicted line crosses zero necessarily but that the slope 
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Conclusion
Two hurricanes occurring within close succession in the same region of 
North America unquestionably constitute a pair of natural disasters. They 
also provide entrée for natural-experiment analysis of the impacts of unan-
ticipated negative shocks on the performance of public organizations—in 
particular, public organizations that are not charged with disaster-related mis-
sions but must seek nonetheless to achieve other important policy goals in the 
face of substantial disruption.
Such major shocks entering organizational systems are likely to carry per-
formance repercussions. Anecdotal evidence from earlier studies bolsters such 
a supposition, and a formal model of public management and performance, 
Table 4. Management of Human Resources Can Overcome the Impact of 
Environmental Shocks
Independent Variable                                     Slope
Students −4.154 (0.92)
Days missed −1.091 (1.02)
Teacher stability −0.044* (1.69)
Students × Teacher Stability 0.049 (0.83)
Days × Teacher Stability 0.011 (0.90)
Lagged pass rate 0.932* (77.19)
n 703
R2 .91
F 528.99
SE 3.21
Note: Dependent variable = All-students TAKS pass rate. Values within parentheses are t 
scores. Equations also control for change in teachers’ salaries, per student instructional funds, 
class size, teachers’ experience, noncertified teachers, Black students, Latino students, and 
poor students. TAKS = Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills.
*p < .05 (one-tailed test).
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used as a basis for the present investigation, also postulates as much. In this 
investigation, two distinct interval-level measures of unanticipated shocks 
were used to examine the question and estimate the extent to which the 
hypothesis is supported. Indeed, with appropriately specified models, both 
measures of shocks from the hurricanes on public educational systems show 
negative and statistically significant effects on student performance—especially 
on the most salient and appropriate criterion commonly used to assess school 
district success. This result is consistent, whether estimations include either 
or both of the variables tapping shocks.
As the analyses of residuals from these equations indicate, nonetheless, 
this pattern does not hold across all the districts. Some public organizations 
overperform in the face of unexpected disruption and some dramatically 
underperform. What makes for the difference? And, in particular, can aspects 
of organization and management mitigate the effects of large-scale negative 
shocks?
Building from the simplified model sketched in equation (4), we reestimate 
the relationships by including, in succession, a measure that taps structural-
stabilizing capacity in the organizations (relative size of central management 
staff) and another that draws from an aspect of internal human resources 
management (stability in the teaching corps). When these structural and man-
agement variables, aspects of the M and S terms contained in equation (4), 
are interacted with the measures of the intensity of negative environmental 
shocks, the negative impacts of the hurricane-related shocks on performance 
are eliminated. More precisely, at higher levels of either central staff capacity 
or teacher stability, school districts dealing with disturbances from Katrina 
and Rita see no significant reductions on their all-pass rate that are attribut-
able to the unexpected shocks.
With the data at hand, it is not possible to establish firmly whether one of 
these two mitigating features is more important in protecting the core educa-
tional production process from disruption. Plausible cases and anecdotal evi-
dence from the districts can be found for both, and the statistical evidence 
that might sort between the two is inconclusive. What can be said is that 
either or both of organizational structure and internal management (M1, in the 
shorthand of the O’Toole–Meier model) can dissipate the performance-
related impacts of unexpected shocks in the system.
In earlier work, Meier and O’Toole (2001, 2003) had demonstrated that 
externally oriented networking by management can have positive impacts on 
performance and that certain aspects of managerial and frontline stability can 
help as well (O’Toole & Meier, 2003). They have also presented evidence 
that the buffering function can support performance and that internal 
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management can protect core tasks from unpleasant budgetary drops (Meier 
& O’Toole, 2008, 2009). The current set of findings complements these ear-
lier studies, because the results here show both that unexpected negative 
shocks carry performance implications and also that organization and man-
agement matter in mitigating these performance expectations.
Public management therefore offers multiple possibilities for defending 
core functions: protecting organizational systems from even the intrusion of 
potentially disruptive influences, establishing structural features that can 
respond to and reduce the impact of intrusions that are experienced, and also 
operating via managerial tasks and systems to dissipate shocks and support 
performance. Externally oriented management matters, but even internally 
focused managerial behavior and structure can provide support for continued 
production in the face of environmentally driven difficulties.
Do these findings mean that public organizations should hire more central 
staff? Unfortunately, direct management implications must be more nuanced 
than this simple injunction. The evidence supports the notion that bolstering 
management capacity in this fashion can help in protecting against the occa-
sional albeit very disruptive disaster. But it may be that other types of unex-
pected and unpleasant disturbances can be best dealt with in other ways, and 
therefore additional research on management in and of disasters in public 
organizations is clearly needed.
In addition, adding central staff is not free—larger management capacity 
involves opportunity costs during more placid times: people and financial 
resources that could be put to other salient uses. Indeed, the more usual 
concern is that upper reaches of especially large bureaucratic units clog 
communication channels, slow down and diffuse decision making, and ren-
der organizational processes more sclerotic (e.g., Light, 1995). Certainly, 
such results are not inevitable; and this analysis of organizations that are 
highly professionalized and not particularly top-heavy indicates that in 
such settings the typical caricature is both unenlightening and misleading. 
How to balance the advantages of management capacity against such 
opportunity costs and potential bureaucratic pathologies is therefore a 
question that must be addressed with due consideration of the types and 
expected frequencies of possible disasters, the costs associated with build-
ing substantial central capacity and other context-specific, clearly relevant 
considerations.
Evidence elsewhere (O’Toole & Meier, 2003) as well as the finding of the 
present study support the notion that frontline personnel stability, which 
helps to stabilize organizational patterns, can offer assistance in stabilizing 
performance. The earlier work shows clear positive impacts in more typical 
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circumstances, whereas this study shows performance contributions when 
disruptions occur. It seems clear therefore that stable teacher employment 
patterns are desirable. Astute human resources management can contribute to 
more stability in the front lines, so bolstering this managerial function can 
pay stabilizing, and thus performance, dividends. But fully systematic explo-
rations of the forces influencing stability in this and other specialties of pub-
lic employment are warranted. Further research therefore can help to sort out 
the determinants of teachers’ (and others’) stability and thus provide addi-
tional direct implications for public management.
It is sometimes impossible to avoid the fire and rain conjured from the 
complex and often turbulent settings within which public programs must 
operate. But when the blazes ignite and the deluge pours forth, public man-
agement of the right sort may be able to douse the threatening flames, fashion 
the requisite dikes, and thereby enable sunny performance days ahead. This 
study suggests that storing organizational capacity at the central office level 
and investing in human resources to reduce turnover are two practical 
approaches to dealing with environmental shocks.
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Notes
1. All data are taken from the official records of the Texas Education Agency.
2.  That fatality figure does not count those who died in the evacuation. The evacu-
ation snarled traffic for several days; adequate supplies of gasoline and water 
were not available on the evacuation routes; and one busload of senior citizens 
perished in a fire. The problems associated with the evacuation of the Texas Gulf 
Coast led to a reassessment of procedures for major evacuations.
3. Using the entire set of 1,043 districts, including the smaller ones, has only mod-
est impact on the results. In that case, the weaker of the two influences, the 
“Katrina” coefficient (explained shortly), fails to attain statistical significance 
(the direction and final results still hold). The results for the “Rita” coefficient 
remain unchanged.
4. The results using all the days were very similar but were affected more by col-
linearity, because many of the Katrina evacuee districts were closed for the Rita 
evacuation but did not sustain physical damage that would have prevented them 
from opening the following week.
5. Here we count as districts affected by one or both shocks any district with a 
nonzero value for enrolling Katrina evacuee students or sustaining a period of at 
least 6 days of closure due to Rita.
6. The hurricane-affected districts are not appreciably different from those not 
affected. Both the Katrina and the Rita districts actually had lower revenues per 
pupil but higher teacher salaries (for Katrina) and larger class sizes. These dif-
ferences are in part a result of the hurricane-affected districts being in the part of 
the state where wages are likely to be higher.
7. The equations in all tables were also estimated using a 3-year average of prior 
TAKS scores rather than just the previous year. The 3-year average tends to 
underestimate the district’s record because the TAKS was a new exam created in 
2003 and there is a positive trend in overall scores as districts and students got 
used to the new exam. The results of this estimation were generally the same as 
those presented but showed a slightly larger impact of the hurricane because it 
underestimated the prior performance of the district.
8. The hurricane-affected districts did not do better as the result of an influx of 
aid. Instructional expenditures per student go up by $645 in districts affected by 
Katrina (vs. $658 for all districts) and $533 in the Rita districts (vs. $661 for all 
other districts). The influx of additional state or federal funds was overwhelmed 
by the total number of new students who arrived.
9. The impact of Katrina might have been larger, but the majority of evacuee stu-
dents were distributed in a ring of school districts in the Houston metropoli-
tan area that are generally fairly high performing and are known for talented 
instruction. The districts with Katrina students, for example, had a TAKS pass 
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rate of 62.8 in 2005 compared to 61.1 for all other districts. They achieved this 
despite having lower revenues per pupil ($8,643 vs. $8,945) and higher student-
to-teacher ratios (14.3 vs. 12.7).
10. The use of the TAKS exam as the most sensitive performance indicator is cor-
roborated by the results for the commended pass rate. The respective coefficients 
for the model in column 3 for that equation were −.184 for the Katrina students 
and −.039 for the days missed. Both were significant but only at the .10 level. 
The commended rate impact of both shocks is about one third the size of the 
impact on the overall TAKS pass rate. The attendance equations show no impact 
for the missed class days, and a coefficient of −.034 for the Katrina students 
(significant at the .10 level). The attendance impacts are tiny and thus need not 
be considered in detail.
11. Hurricanes aside, many of the districts regularly receive a large number of stu-
dents after the start of the school year because the families of migrant workers 
return to Texas after working harvests further north. The Houston Independent 
School District, for example, starts the school year with approximately 176,000 
students and has a peak enrollment of 210,000 students in November. These 
evaluation systems are generally administered by central management in order 
to avoid disrupting the schools.
12. One might also interpret this variable as embedded slack, as Sorenson (2003) 
would.
13. The findings are not the result of districts with greater central office capacity sim-
ply being wealthier districts. The correlation between central office bureaucracy 
and property tax wealth per student is .03 (not significant). There is a positive 
correlation between revenues per student (which include state and federal funds) 
and central office bureaucracy of .26, but for districts with 1,500 students or more 
this correlation is an insignificant .04. The measure is the percentage of employees 
in the central office bureaucracy, which is likely why the measure is unrelated to 
district wealth. Similarly, teacher turnover is not related to school district wealth.
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